Witness today's Friedman column advising us that we desperately need to pass the cap-and-trade bill he describes as "a mess," which he "detests." What profound insight does he give us about the reasons we need this detestable mess to have the force of law?
Firstly, because not passing it would hurt our image with
... for all its flaws, this bill is the first comprehensive attempt by America to mitigate climate change by putting a price on carbon emissions. Rejecting this bill would have been read in the world as America voting against the reality and urgency of climate change and would have undermined clean energy initiatives everywhere.
That was my emphasis above. It's necessary when parsing through a Friedman citation because he piles so much extraneous stuff around his subjects and predicates he often misleads you into thinking he's putting more substance in there than he really is.
Anyway, reason number one we urgently need a detestable mess governing our energy laws according to Friedman is for the sake of how rejecting it would be "read in the world." We may be damned if we do, but we're surely damned if we don't... damned by the world itself. Yikes! That all the myriad views across the world could possibly be so neatly and simply summed up in one single speculation is part of the magic of Friedman's style.
The second reason Friedman thinks we need a very bad bill passed into law is because he has some kind of hazy vision that it will lead to a change in the way people think. He doesn't pretend to be able to explain it. But he's just got a kind of gut feeling. And no, I am not putting words into his mouth here (again, my emphasis below):
More important, my gut tells me that if the U.S. government puts a price on carbon, even a weak one, it will usher in a new mind-set among consumers, investors, farmers, innovators and entrepreneurs that in time will make a big difference — much like the first warnings that cigarettes could cause cancer. The morning after that warning no one ever looked at smoking the same again.
Okay so, apparently we need a detestable bill passed into law for the sake of global image management and because of our abiding trust in Tom Friedman's gut feelings. This is beginning to appear as not so much a piece of analysis as a poorly supported opinion fueled by visions of a future in which the nations of the world are united as one and carbon dioxide is universally considered cancerous and gross. Compelling as that vision may sound it's not terribly solid reason to support this thing despite its already noted ickyness. Surely after realizing he has yet to connect the dots between the actual bill under discussion and its real-world implications Friedman would realize its time to get the the heart of the matter and give us some amazingly good reason to support this thing. And he attempts to do just that.
Reason the third we need detestable messiness in our laws:
Henceforth, every investment decision made in America — about how homes are built, products manufactured or electricity generated — will look for the least-cost low-carbon option. And weaving carbon emissions into every business decision will drive innovation and deployment of clean technologies to a whole new level and make energy efficiency much more affordable. That ain’t beanbag.
Well he tried anyway.
According to Friedman, after this bill is made law "every investment decision" is not only going to look for the lowest cost option - which is already what's done (spare me the quibbles and caveats, we're speaking at a very high level here). Ever after investors are also going to look for the lowest carbon option. Or, perhaps, Friedman means the lowest carbon option will automatically become the lowest cost option after this bill is passed. In either case he's very wrong so let's sort out the reasons why.
The reason the first version is wrong - the one in which investors look for least-cost AND low-carbon options for their investments - is that they are already able to do this without the need for any new law. If "least-cost" and "low-carbon" do not have to be the same thing for investors you wouldn't need "cap-and-trade." At most you'd need some kind of new labeling requirement so consumers could take "low-carbon" into their decision making the same way they can take "saturated fat" into their food purchase decisions. So, no, investors are not going to be looking for least-cost and low-carbon independently after this law is passed. They're not going to do so as a result of this bill anyway.
That leaves us with the other version: the least-cost option will also be the low-carbon option after this bill is passed into law. Except that is most definitely not true. And that's not a problem with the details of Waxman-Markey, its a problem with the very concept of taxing carbon emissions itself.
To understand why this is not true you simply need to think through the way this bill intends to impact cost in the first place. The bill intends to make carbon dioxide emissions, which currently cost producers nothing at all, into a taxable item. By way of analogy it's comparable to the 1696 British law taxing houses according to the number of windows they possessed. In that law there was a certain "floor" level established (six windows) below which there was no tax. Anything above the floor level would be taxed at an ever increasing amount based on the number of windows. In response to the tax, a number of home owners bricked up many of their windows to avoid paying the tax. Others lost some of their income to the government which they would have otherwise retained. Obviously either course of action cost home owners money, in the former case the cost of bricks, mortar and labor for bricking over existing windows, in the latter case the cost of paying the tax.

Cap-and-trade's cost mechanism works the same way. Below a certain floor level of carbon-dioxide emission there is no new cost at all. It's business as usual. If you're a little bit above the floor level, you might be able to find new ways to lower your carbon emissions by making a few changes to the way you do business - the analogue to "bricking over some windows." Any companies in this situation would obviously have to pay for these changes in some way that would show up to their customers as "increased cost." Thus favoring lower carbon alternatives that may be in competition with them in the short term. But in the long run the "business as usual" companies and the "bricked over some windows" companies would be competing once again on equal terms. Under the guiding principles of cap-and-trade, this is as it should be. The bill is intended to force those companies which can do business while emitting less carbon to "brick over the necessary windows" (i.e. make carbon emission improvements).
But the biggest area of "cost" intended by this bill is among the businesses which simply cannot "brick over" enough "windows" to avoid the tax. These are the biggest carbon emitters, and the main target of the bill. The idea is, since so many low carbon alternatives under current technology cannot compete with their high carbon counterparts on price, we need to artificially raise the price of emitting carbon dioxide. It's very cheap to produce energy by burning coal or oil - so let's make it more expensive to do so. As that cost is passed on to consumers of anything produced by energy (i.e. everything) natural market forces will drive investment into areas of low carbon emission in favor of high carbon emission. That's how it's supposed to work - even if it makes it prohibitively expensive for some businesses to stay in business at all. Cap-and-trade omelette? Meet your broken eggs.
The further intent of this bill, also alluded to by Friedman in the above quotation, is to drive investment into the area of energy production itself, prompting the creation new kinds of low-carbon energy production which would allow the cost of low-carbon energy to eventually compete with high-carbon energy even without an artificial tax distorting things. The market force intended to work here is "if you tax it, they will find a way around it."
Unfortunately lawmakers suffer from the same problem as Friedman and only think about the ways they intend people to respond to a new tax without sufficiently thinking through the unintended consequences. In the case of the 1696 window law, lawmakers didn't intend for homeowners to brick over their windows. They wanted them to pay the tax. The whole purpose of the bill was to raise revenue, not restrict sunlight. In this case lawmakers intend to reduce the emission of carbon dioxide. Higher costs are just means to that end the same way windows were a means to the end of government revenue in the window tax example. But will businesses within America and governments around the globe really just buckle under and penalize themselves financially while inventing as-yet-unknown low-carbon alternative energy sources? Don't you think some might look for ways to reduce their cost by avoiding the tax without having to reduce their carbon emissions? And might attempts to restrict those alternatives produce unintended consequences of their own?
Anyway, Friedman is finished explaining the urgency of passing an admittedly detestable piece of legislation leaving his reasons for doing so as:
1. Avoiding a bad global impression which would be created by not passing it.
2. Tom's "gut feeling" that it will change the way people think.
3. It will drive investment into low carbon alternatives over high carbon options.
Without going into exhaustive detail, here are the main problems with each of Tom's points:
1. The "globe" is far from unified in their opinion about capping carbon emissions. China and India have flat out refused to consider doing so in any manner that would limit their economic growth. That means no carbon restrictions in the fastest growing major economies in the world, including the world's largest carbon dioxide emitter, regardless of this legislation.
2. Tom's "gut feelings" don't have a great track record.
3. As the "bricked over windows" illustrate, investors will explore all sorts of alternatives beyond simply accepting artificially increased costs while they search for a technological breakthrough. The details - those detestable, messy things Friedman admits he doesn't like in this case - matter VERY much. It's not important to understand what you want the consequences of this bill to be. It's important to understand the unintended consequences at least as well.
But, like an affable college sophomore content that he has overcome his fellow classmates' possible objections with an unassailable mastery of all the relevant facts, Friedman charges on to point out the problems with this bill. They are, according to Friedman, as follows:
1. Republicans
2. President Obama
3. The American People.
Again, I am not making this up:
Now that the bill is heading for the Senate, though, we must, ideally, try to improve it, but, at a minimum, guard against diluting it any further. To do that we need the help of the three parties most responsible for how weak the bill already is: the Republican Party, President Barack Obama and We the People.
Oh Friedman does think some of the problems involve the people who actually wrote the bill. They're involved the same way the victim of a drive-by shooting is "involved" in that particular transaction:
This bill is not weak because its framers, Representatives Henry Waxman and Ed Markey, wanted it this way. “They had to make the compromises they did,” said Dan Becker, director of the Safe Climate Campaign, “because almost every House Republican voted against the bill and did nothing to try to improve it. So to get it passed, they needed every coal-state Democrat, and that meant they had to water it down to bring them on board.”
Please note that requiring compromise to pass legislation is how our system of government is supposed to work. It's designed to prevent a minority from plundering the wealth and/or freedom of the majority. Not that such trivialities apply in this case of course.
There are a whole host of reasons one might object to this particular piece of legislation, even if one believes as fervently as Friedman in the supreme imperative to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, though Friedman doesn't bother to explore any of them. There aren't really any reasons this legislation must be rushed through Congress at maximum speed before even allowing Congressmen to read the bill itself, though that goes without comment from Friedman. In that light the incredulous outrage regarding the need to make (sneer) compromises in such a bill is jaw-droppingly misdirected.
The bill's authors cannot be held to account for this deeply "compromised" bill why, exactly? If they had taken the time to work with other legislators - even if they shut out every single Republican - they should have been able to write a bill that could pass despite uniform Republican opposition. And this is largely what they did. With Democrats controlling the House by a majority of seventy nine, Waxman-Markey passed by seven votes, including eight Republicans. They gave Republican legislators the absolute minimum level of engagement necessary.
The lesson Friedman takes from this? Hold the crafters of this legislation to account for their incredibly partisan approach? Gosh no. Instead he begins a rant that goes on for four paragraphs beginning with "What are Republicans thinking?" The better question is: "Why does Tom Friedman think the minority party is more relevant to this discussion than the people who actually wrote and voted for this bill?"
On a side note, Friedman drops this gem of an observation in the middle of telling off Republicans:
Yes, this bill’s goal of reducing U.S. carbon emissions to 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 is nowhere near what science tells us we need to mitigate climate change.
So according to Friedman it's not just badly compromised, but it's also not going to accomplish much good even if it works as planned? Nifty! The disparity between Friedman's reasons for supporting this thing and the incidental details he doesn't seem to find as important is growing intriguing in its own right.
Oh, and remember that list of problems with the bill above? The one where he blamed Republicans, President Obama, and the American people? Yah, it's mostly just Republicans. Obama is suspect only because he hasn't been loud enough in his support... yet. And the American people part? That's really just a call-to-action for a mass movement among the youth to flood the Washington mall with
And then there is We the People. Attention all young Americans: your climate future is being decided right now in the cloakrooms of the Capitol, where the coal lobby holds huge sway. You want to make a difference? Then get out of Facebook and into somebody’s face. Get a million people on the Washington Mall calling for a price on carbon. That will get the Senate’s attention. Play hardball or don’t play at all.
"Play hardball or don't play at all." Where hardball equals mass demonstrations supporting a detestable, terribly compromised piece of legislation which "is nowhere near what science tells us we need to mitigate climate change." Or maybe just getting "into somebody's face." Because teenagers angrily lecturing us about complex energy legislation is just the thing we need to drive our policies at the moment.
As I've noted before, the most striking thing about climate alarmists, Friedman among them, is their dogmatic support for "taking action" even while admitting their preferred actions won't work, may cause harm, and there remain viable alternatives which could be explored. In this case Friedman wants to pass bad legislation which admittedly won't make a difference in combating global warming but will somehow make a difference in some fuzzy, hard to describe way making it totally worth Americans paying artificially higher costs somehow.
























